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Abstract 
Shadow economy encompasses wide array of activities that influence the official economy and government 
policies, either directly or indirectly. In this paper we estimate the shadow economy of Pakistan using 
currency demand approach with two econometric approached, i.e. one using Auto Regressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) model and two with Engel Granger two step approach. Additionally, we use a variant of 
currency demand approach where along with tax variable we include unemployment rate and intensity of 
government control as indicator variables of shadow economy, for the first time in case of Pakistan. The 
average shadow economy of Pakistan estimated from 1973-2015 as percentage of GDP is 26.41, 25.29, and 
26.11 from Models 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Furthermore, we analyzed interaction between the official and 
shadow sector using ARDL model. Our results show a significantly increasing shadow economy in Pakistan 
with positive impact on the official sector in long run while negative impact in the short run. This again is 
a novelty in our paper where we observe short and long run impacts separately along with dynamic 
simulations to show Pakistan’s GDP per Capita in the absence of shadow economy. 
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1. Introduction 
The focus of any economy is implementation of viable policies for its social development and economic 
prosperity and National Accounts provide a set of statistical data for the purpose of economic analysis, 
decisions and policy making. It is widely used as an indicator of economic activity and measures 
performance of the economy using important parameters such as GDP/GNP, Investment, Savings, and 
Inflation etc. Therefore, national accounts calculations are essential for formulation of economic policies. 
The quality of national accounts data can be judged by the level up to which it covers all the economic 
activities. They are treated to be the true picture of an economy. But the shadow economic activities, whose 
prime objective is to work without detection, hinder this objective. Economists, policy makers, businessmen 
and foreign investors base their policies on the available economic indicators, however, in case of presence 
of the shadow economy; the indicators do not depict the real scenario, resulting in ineffective policies in 
some cases.  
 
Pakistan is a developing country faced with many challenges. As per the estimates of UNDP the multi-
dimensional poverty index shows 38.8 % people in Pakistan can be classified as poor during 2004-153 while 
4 out of 10 Pakistanis live in multidimensional poverty4. In order to improve their economic conditions and 
ensure rapid development; effective policies are required which can only be ensured if the macroeconomic 
indicators are unbiased and accurate. However, this is only possible if the shadow economy is measured 
and incorporated in their policy framework. There have been multiple estimates of Pakistan’s shadow 
economy which tend to point towards its growing size. Although there are multiple methodologies for 
estimating the shadow economy (to be discussed in methodology section), yet currency demand approach 
has been most widely used in case of Pakistan. This approach uses causes for existence of shadow economy 
and incorporates indicators to capture additional demand for currency. The most commonly used cause is 
increase in taxes, which increases shadow economy as per the theoretical and empirical literature. Most of 
the estimates of Pakistan assume tax as the only indicator variable with slight changes in definition of 
dependent or independent variables. Only Arby, Malik and Hanif (2010) considered unemployment rate 
prevailing in the economy as one of the indicator variables in their currency demand equation. There has 
been discussion in theoretical and empirical literature about intensity of government regulations and control 
in the economy which postulates that this leads to increased shadow economic activities [Johnson, 
Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997), Schneider and Dreher (2006), Loayza (1996)]. Yet this aspect has been 
ignored in Pakistan’s estimates owing to difficulty in quantification. 
 
Most of the developing countries are marred with complex processes and bureaucratic formalities that are 
required for all essential services. This drives the economic agents to look for alternatives which can also 
be in the form of tax evasion, bribes and kickbacks. Pakistan is also not different where the size of its public 
sector employment is reflective of extensive government control on the economy. The process of 
automation and use of MIS to improve processes is a recent emerging trend in public offices. Still the 
regulations, their intensity and overlapping procedural formalities make Pakistan a difficult country to run 
business in. In 2017 Pakistan slipped down three places on world’s “Ease of Doing Business” index to 147th 
rank among 190 countries5. This points towards extensive codal formalities in various processes in Pakistan. 
Another important aspect that has been ignored in Pakistan’s estimates is the effect of shadow economy on 
the official sector. Although shadow economy is widely accepted to be a nuisance because of the previously 
discussed policy issues as well as the fact that illegal activities have deep roots in the hidden sector. Yet it 
might be giving survival opportunities to the officially unemployed, and is considered to be very dynamic 
                                                          
3 http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/hiv_aids/Multidimensional-Poverty-in-Pakistan.html 
4 UNDP Press Release June 20, 2016: “Pakistan’s new poverty index reveals that 4 out of 10 Pakistanis live in multidimensional 
poverty” 
5 Shahbaz, R. (2017, November 1). Pakistan now ranked 147th in World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index. The Express 
Tribunal. Retrieved from URL: https://tribune.com.pk/story/1546434/2-pakistan-now-ranked-147th-world-banks-ease-
business-index/ 
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and can change with economic conditions as against formal sector which is marred with bureaucratic 
formalities. 
 
This paper is an attempt to estimate shadow economy of Pakistan, but the novelty comes from use of ARDL 
with three indicator variables. Most of the authors used OLS for shadow economy estimates of Pakistan via 
currency demand approach (except Arby et al (2010) and Kiani et al (2015) who also used ARDL). OLS 
estimates might not be consistent since it is estimated on time series variables and there is a chance of unit 
root. Just like preceding authors we use a tax variable but we also include unemployment rate and a proxy 
for “intensity of regulation and control” by the government in an economy which is known to be one of the 
causes of shadow economy. Hence we expect increased taxes, increased unemployment, and increased 
intensity of regulations and control in Pakistan to have statistically and economically significant impact in 
increasing shadow economy. Detailed discussion of indicator variables will follow in section 3.2. We build 
three models for estimations where two have been estimated using Engel Granger two step approach while 
one has been estimated by employing ARDL bounds testing approach. We provide latest estimates from 
1975 to 2015 with these indicator variables which is not available in literature. Also for the first time in 
case of Pakistan we link our estimates with the political regime at the time and find that the results are very 
consistent with the actual events in a specific regime.  
 
Another novel aspect of this paper is the use of dynamic simulations to show what the actual GDP per 
Capita of Pakistan would be if shadow economy is not present. For this we estimate an ARDL model for 
the short and long run effects of the shadow economy on official sector which as per the authors’ knowledge 
is not available in literature in case of Pakistan. Then we show the distortion in GDP per Capita first by 
only considering the long run effect of shadow economy and then including short run effect as well.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the existing literature published on 
Pakistan’s estimates of Shadow Economy. In Section 3 we discuss definition of a shadow economy and 
present the main causes for the existence of a shadow economy. In section 4 we show the estimation 
methodology and the used dependent and independent variables. Section 5 presents the econometric results 
and section 6 provides the size and development of the shadow economy for Pakistan over 1973 to 2015. 
Section 7 consists of interaction between official and unofficial sectors and finally section 8 presents a 
summary and draws some conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Empirical studies on Pakistan have shown the growth in shadow economy and tax evasion. Table 1 presents 
a summary of all the estimates on shadow economy of Pakistan (up to the authors knowledge). Kemal 
(2007) used three currency demand equations all having the ratio of currency in circulation and     
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Table 1 Summary of Literature on Shadow Economy Estimates of Pakistan 
Sr. No. Authors Estimation Period Theoretical Approach 
Empirical 
Estimation 
Methodology 
Main Results6 
1. 
Ahmed and 
Ahmed 
(1995),  
1960-1990 
Modified Tanzi’s Monetary 
Approach including bearer 
bonds 
OLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 41.79%. Overall Increase in Tax 
Evasion and SE, but decline in SE as percentage of GDP. 
2. 
Shabsigh 
(1995), 
1975-1991 
Modified Tanzi’s Monetary 
Approach used to estimate 
shadow economy as 
percentage of domestic, 
exports and imports sectors 
OLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 22.70% 
Overall Increase in in SE as percentage of GDP. 
Showed Short run and Long run relationship between SE 
and Govt Budget Deficit 
3. 
Aslam 
(1998), 
1960-1998 
Modified Tanzi’s Monetary 
Approach including dummy 
for Resident Foreign 
Currency Accounts  
OLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 39.33%. High level of Shadow 
Economy susceptible to/fluctuating with changes in 
policies and political scenario 
4. 
Iqbal, 
Qureshi, 
and 
Mahmood 
(1998), 
1973-1996 
Modified Tanzi’s Monetary 
Approach including 
domestic and foreign tax 
variables 
OLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 34.30%. Increasing Shadow 
Economy and Tax Evasion 
5. 
Kemal 
(2003), 
1974-2002 Modified Tanzi’s Approach OLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 31.82%. Increasing Shadow 
Economy 
6. 
Yasmin and 
Rauf 
(2003), 
1974-2002 Tanzi’s Approach OLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 23.62%. Increasing Shadow 
Economy. Shadow Economy and Tax Evasion has 
negative impact on Formal economy 
8. 
Kemal 
(2007), 
1974-2005 Modified Tanzi’s Approach 
OLS and VAR 
Model 
Avg Shadow Economy from 3 equations: 25.77, 49.54, 
and 36.37 %. Increasing Shadow Economy. Using 
Cointegration found significant positive long run 
association between Official and Unofficial Economies. 
While using VAR results showed positive effect of SE 
on GDP in Short run but no effect of Formal economy on 
SE. 
9. 
Ahmed and 
Hussain 
(2008) 
1960-2003 Modified Tanzi’s Approach OLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 25.22, and 30.51%. Using 
dummy for Tax Reforms of 1997, showed that tax 
reforms reduced unofficial demand for money. 
                                                          
6 Results also include Average Shadow Economy (SE) as percentage of GDP over the estimation period; based on estimates presented in Kemal and Qasim 2012) 
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10. 
Arby, Malik 
and Hanif 
(2010) 
1966-2008 
 
Modified Tanzi’s Approach ARDL 
Avg Shadow Economy: 29.68%. First an increasing 
trend with largest increase in 1990s and then decline. 
1973-2008 MIMIC Approach 
Structural 
Equation 
Models 
Avg Shadow Economy: 29.43 %. First a sharp increasing 
trend then consistent between 20-30% from 1980s to 
2000s 
1975-2008 Electricity Consumption - Avg Shadow Economy: 21.60 %. 
11. 
Gulzar 
Junaid and 
Haider 
(2010) 
1982-2010 Tanzi’s Approach OLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 34.11 %. Concluded that SE 
between 32-38 % of GDP 
1973-2010 Modified Tanzi’s Approach DOLS 
Avg Shadow Economy: 23.84 %. Concluded that SE 
between 20-22 % of GDP 
1973-2010 MIMIC 
Structural 
Equation 
Models 
Avg Shadow Economy: 29.93 %. Concluded that SE 
around 28 % of GDP 
1974-2010 
Electricity Consumption 
Approach 
- 
Avg Shadow Economy: 50.25 %. Concluded that SE 
between 20-22 % of GDP 
2002-2010 Labor Market Approach - 
Avg Shadow Economy: 26.74%. Negative relationship 
between growth rate of real GDP and avg. yearly income 
in informal sector. 
12. 
Kemal and 
Qasim 2012 
2007-08 
Kemal & Qasim Approach 
(Discrepancy Approach 
based on import & export 
mis-invoicing) 
- 
Estimated SE as 91.44 % of GDP for 2007-08. The 
author expects that estimates are still an underestimate 
owing to non-adjustment of investment data. 
13. 
Kiani, 
Ahmed, & 
Zaman 
(2015) 
1975-2010 Modified Tanzi’s Approach ARDL 
They average shadow economy of their estimates is 
26.72%.   
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foreign currency accounts to Money supply as dependent variable, for the period 1974 to 2005. His 
estimates showed that in 2005 the shadow economy ranged from 54.6 to 62.8 as percentage of GDP.  
 
The tax revenue lost by Pakistan is of utmost importance for its economy and Ahmed and Ahmed (1995) 
estimated a revenue loss between Rs 40 to Rs 45 billion in 1989-90 alone due to black economy. The 
estimates of Pakistan by Ahmed and Ahmed (1995), Shabsigh (1995), Aslam (1998), Iqbal, Qureshi, and 
Mahmood (1998), Kemal (2003), Yasmin and Rauf (2003), Kemal (2007), Ahmed and Haider (2008), used 
Tanzi’s currency demand equation and considered taxation as a major cause for increase of the shadow 
economy and used it as explanatory variable in one form or another. However, three recent studies are Arby, 
Malik and Hanif (2010), Gulzar, Junaid and Haider (2010), Kemal and Qasim (2012) and Kiani et al (2015). 
Arby et al. (2010) employed Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model and provided estimates uptill 2008 
using Tax and Unemployment as indicators of shadow economy. They also estimated using electricity 
consumption approach and MIMIC model.  
 
On the other hand, Gulzar et al. (2010) used monetary, Labor Market, MIMIC, and Electricity Consumption 
approaches. Kemal and Qasim (2012) developed a new discrepancy approach (KQ Approach); where they 
calculated total private consumption from the household survey for the total population and included mis-
invoicing of imports and exports to calculate the true estimates of GDP for 2007-2008. The difference 
between this and published GDP was termed as shadow economy. Comparative graphs of the monetary 
approach based estimates, already highlighted in Table 1 above, are presented in Figures 1 & 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 1     Shadow Economy Estimates of Pakistan up till 2003 
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Figure 2   Shadow Economy Estimates of Pakistan from 2003 to 2010 
Most of the studies showed shadow economy between 20 to 60 percent of the GDP over their respective 
estimation periods, except for Kemal (2007) whose estimates are on much higher side between the years 
1995 to 2000s. As is evident from table 1, most of the authors while using currency demand approach 
utilized OLS to estimate the regression model, which might face the issue of cointegration and unit root, 
except for the cases of Arby et al. (2010) and Kian et al. (2015) who used ARDL, and Gulzar et al. (2010) 
who used DOLS using maximum likelihood approach. The prime variable of interest or the indicator 
variable has been tax variable in all the studies, while Arby et al. (2010) also added unemployment as an 
indicator. This is where our study brings novelty in the existing estimates of Pakistan, first by using ARDL 
and then having a proxy for government regulation and control exercised in the economy in addition to the 
unemployment and tax variable. The intensity of government control in the economy (to be discussed in 
detail in section 3.2.2) is expected to play a significant role in increasing shadow economic activities in the 
economy. Additionally, this study also contains another ARDL to capture the short and long run effects of 
shadow economy on the official sector along with dynamic simulations to present the magnitude of this 
interaction. 
 
3. Theoretical Considerations 
3.1 Defining Shadow Economy 
There is yet to be a consensus among economists on the definition of the shadow economy hence it has 
acquired many names like Informal Economy, Underground Economy, Hidden or Black Economy, 
Unofficial Economy, Parallel Economy, Clandestine Economy, however there is a general agreement that 
the shadow economy comprises of hidden economic activities which result in distorted National Accounts. 
Tanzi (1999) emphasized “there cannot be any question that the underground economy is a real 
phenomenon with important implications that deserve attention and study”.7 
 
To some extend the definitions are based on what exactly the researcher intends to measure and which part 
of the shadow economy is unveiled, i.e. whether the researcher intends to study just tax evasion, or informal 
labor markets, or informal household sector, or the research is carried out at a much macro level. A broader 
definition (OECD (2002)) is: “The shadow economy is defined as those activities that are productive and 
legal but are deliberately concealed from the public authorities to avoid payment of taxes and social security 
contributions or complying with regulations”. 
 
                                                          
7 See e.g. Vito Tanzi (1999), Feld and Schneider (2010), Schneider (2010), and Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010). 
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For the purpose of research, we could not differentiate independently between legal and illegal activities 
since it is very difficult to get accurate data for smuggling, prostitution, and drug dealing etc. from Pakistan. 
And even if the data on such illegal activities is acquired somehow, the data reliability would be 
questionable. Therefore, since we are using currency demand approach, it is possible that the figures of 
shadow economy could include all unregistered economic activities, legal or illegal, that rely on cash based 
transactions and contribute to the officially published GNP.  
 
3.2 Main Causes for the Existence of the Shadow Economy8 
3.2.1 Increased Taxation 
It is obvious that higher tax rates result in lower disposable income and reduce the incentives for workers 
to work in the official sector. Hence they might shift their activities towards unofficial sector where there 
is no taxation. Almost all the economists are of the same opinion that increased taxation and social security 
contributions play a vital role in increasing the shadow economy. Schneider (2006) mentions that  
“The burden of taxation and social security contributions has a strong influence 
on individuals’ cost-benefit and/or labor-leisure choices because it heavily 
increases the opportunity cost for legal economic activities and finally reduces 
the profitability of legal (official) work. The greater the difference between total 
cost of labor in the official economy and after-tax earnings from work, the greater 
is the incentive to work in the shadow economy.” 
 
Schneider and Halla (2005) argue that the idea of high tax morale is closely related to Motivation Crowding 
Theory. The motivation crowding theory is based on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation factors influencing 
an individual’s rational decision process. The intrinsic motivation of an individual is affected by the 
extrinsic factors, so the external factors like monetary benefits or increase in taxation can increase or 
decrease the tax morale of that individual. Spiro (1993) states “experience in other countries suggests that 
evasion of value-added taxes is a significant problem at the retail level. There is a likelihood that, at the 
margin, switching from the narrow-based federal manufacturers’ sales tax to the broad based goods and 
services tax (GST) may have increased the incentives and opportunities for tax evasion”. For Canada, 
Drummond et al. (1994) acknowledge the role of the increase in taxes including GST in the growth of 
shadow economy and also suggest that since the income tax was not increased either in 1991 or 1992, the 
increase in shadow economy may be due to the GST. In underdeveloped countries where a substantial 
number of people are living below the poverty line and yet many are striving to stay above it, taxes play a 
significant role in deciding whether they should work in the official or unofficial sector.  
 
We summarize: Hypothesis 1: The higher the tax burden, the higher the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.2.2 Intensity of Regulations 
Restrictions by the government like permits and licenses increase prices of the goods and services by adding 
extra costs. It leaves a gap for underground workers and firms who can do the same at much lower costs. 
The relation between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation from the Motivation crowing theory can also be 
applied in the context of regulations. If the extrinsic factors like regulations, license fees, permits etc. cause 
an individual to feel overburdened and reduce his intrinsic motivation, it may result in pushing him towards 
shadow sector. The countries which have strong bureaucratic government structures also have various 
formalities even in simple procedures (red-tapism). Such formalities push certain agents either firms or 
individuals to look for and make use of shortcuts in the system or in some cases even bypass the system, 
which leads to hidden sector. Red-tapism often results in bribery etc. to speed up the process or to even get 
the job done in its due course of time. Such rules and regulations reduce the freedom of choice for 
individuals to work in the official sector and they are pushed towards the informal sector by the system 
itself. 
                                                          
8 For a comprehensive survey of all possible causes see Feld and Schneider (2010) and Schneider and Enste (2000) 
9 
 
 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) found empirical evidence that the countries with higher degree of 
regulations in their economies tend to have larger share of Shadow Economy in their GDP. They also 
conclude that implementing more regulations rather than enforcement of existing ones increases the shadow 
economy. Schneider and Enste (1998, 2000) suggest that Governments should put more emphasis on 
improving enforcement of the laws and regulations, rather than increasing their numbers. Loayza (1996) 
argues that as enforcement strength rises the relative size of the shadow economy decreases. Governments, 
however, prefer this policy option (more regulations and laws) when trying to reduce the shadow economy, 
mostly because this leads to an increased power of bureaucrats and a higher rate of employment in public 
sector. Schneider and Dreher (2006) also argue that more rigid regulations increases both corruption and 
shadow economy.  
 
Again we summarize, hypothesis 2: The greater the intensity of regulation, the higher the shadow economy, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
3.2.3 State of the “Official” economy 
If the official economy is in a recession and/or if we observe low growth rates, unemployment increases 
providing people with more opportunities and necessities to work in shadow economy. Moreover, increased 
government restrictions on the labor market (minimum education level, minimum wage, maximum working 
hours) may cause extra burden on the firms for hiring as well as resulting in fewer job opportunities. Hence 
the job market is tightened with the effect of increasing unemployment. Unemployment together with 
increased taxation, high inflation, and minimal or no unemployment funds leads to the choice to become 
an unofficial economic agent, especially in case of developing countries where there is either minimal or 
nothing at all with respect to unemployment compensation.  
 
Finally, we formulate hypothesis 3: The higher the unemployment rate, the higher is the shadow economy, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
4. Estimation Methodology and Used Variables 
 
There are multiple approaches to estimate shadow economy. The effectiveness of each approach mainly 
depends to two aspects, namely; which part of hidden economy a researcher intends to explore and the data 
availability which further depends on the country of origin. The approaches are broadly classified into direct 
and indirect approached, each of which have their own pros and cons. The direct approaches include survey 
questionnaires and tax auditing, however, the reliability of response in both of these approaches is 
questionable. The indirect approaches include national accounts discrepancy approach where the difference 
in income and expenditure side of national accounts can be treated as shadow economy. However, as 
pointed out by Schneider and Enste (2000); the national accounts statisticians will be anxious to minimize 
this difference and hence the published national accounts would not represent the true picture. Electricity 
demand approach is another indirect approach which is based on the assumption that GDP and Electricity 
has elasticity close to one, so the growth in total electricity consumption is an indicator of growth of total 
GDP, which includes the official as well as unofficial GDP. Therefore, overall growth in electricity can 
give a measure of shadow economy if official GDP is subtracted from the simulated GDP using electricity 
consumption. However, this approach will at best measure small scale household manufacturing in the 
shadow sector, since many shadow activities do not require use of electricity. Furthermore, with extensive 
electricity load shedding in Pakistan, many small scale businesses are dependent on diesel or gas generators, 
which further complicates the estimations. Another indirect approach is Multiple Indicators Multiple 
Causes (MIMIC) model which is latent or unobserved variables approach and in this case shadow economy 
is measured as a latent variable over time. Despite its advanced ability of catering for more than one cause 
and indicator variables this approach also has some shortcomings. As pointed out by Schneider (2006) that 
it shows volatility in the estimates with changes in sample size and specifications. The indirect approach 
10 
 
used in this paper is currency demand approach. This approach assumes that most of the transactions in 
shadow economy take place in the form of cash. Assuming Tax rate (used by Tanzi (1980, 1983)) as one 
of the reasons for increase in shadow economy, a currency demand equation is estimated while controlling 
for all the other factors influencing official demand for cash like per capita income, interest rate etc. Again 
assuming that at minimum tax rate there would be no shadow economy the equation is used to estimate the 
total shadow economy as percentage of GDP. This approach has been most widely used indirect approach 
for estimations in  various countries and is known to produce acceptable results.9 Schneider and Hametner 
(2007) selected a variant of currency demand approach in which two tax variables (direct and indirect tax) 
were included to estimate the additional demand for cash induced due to shadow economic activities. A 
similar attempt, using a modified currency demand approach, has been made by Ardizzi, Petraglia, 
Piacenza, and Turati (2012), in which the authors have used “Ratio of the value of cash withdrawn from 
bank accounts to the value of total payments settled by instruments other than the bank” as a dependent 
variable. Considering the few basic assumptions of the shadow economic activities, the agents in unofficial 
sector do not prefer bank deposits or any other traceable financial asset, due to fear of prosecution in case 
of illegal activities and taxation in case of legal activities. Therefore, it can be assumed that such kind of 
dependent variable, which is based on bank account transaction, could only capture a small segment of the 
shadow sector, where the individuals do not fear to deposit their hidden cash in the banks. In order to capture 
a larger share of the shadow sector we use the currency deposit ratio as the dependent variable, where the 
currency demand consisted of currency outside deposit money banks.  
 
In this paper, we have used yearly data from 1973 to 2015 to estimate currency demand equation for 
Pakistan and include shadow economy indicator variables in addition to traditional currency demand 
explanatory variables like GDP per capita, household consumption expenditure and rate of inflation. All 
the data was collected from State bank of Pakistan’s “Handbook of Pakistan Economy 2005” and yearly 
reports. The data for Inflation is from World Development Indicators. We establish a cointegrating 
relationship between the currency deposit ratio and other related variables and then use it to deduce the size 
of the informal sector in Pakistan’s economy. Instead of only using a Tax variable, we also use 
unemployment rate and government’s public admin and defense expenditure as a proxy of intensity of 
regulations and control over the economy. Larger public and defense expenditure represents more control 
over the economy by government in terms of more manpower as well as infrastructure. 
 
Since we are using time series variables therefore, there is a possibility of unit roots and cointegration. We 
use two different techniques to estimate our model. First we employ Engel Granger Two Step Approach 
suggested by Engle and Granger (1987). In case there is unit root in variables, the EG model is first 
estimated at level and its residual is tested for unit root. If the residual is stationary, which is confirmation 
of cointegration, a second model is estimated at differences where lag of residual from first model appears 
as error correction term. Therefore, in this approach the coefficients with differenced variables express the 
short run relationship while the lagged residual from the level model establishes long run cointegration and 
shows erjror correction. We estimate the following two models10 using this approach: 
 
                                                          
9 Detailed discussion on various estimation procedures and critique to each of them has been extensively done by Schneider & 
Enste (2000) and Feld & Schneider (2010). 
10 The only difference in above two models is how the proxy for government regulations and control enter into each model. We 
have used Government’s Public Admin and Defense Expenditure (PADE) in model 1 while Government’s Public Admin and 
Defense Expenditure per Capita (PADEPC) in model 2. This is only to ensure that our results are stable, since if the two variables 
are a true proxy of the same concept (excessive control), the size of coefficient should not change drastically with change in their 
calculation.  
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where, 
C2DD is the Currency Deposit Ratio 
TAXGDP is the Direct Tax Revenue as percentage of GDP  
UNEMP is Rate of Unemployment 
PADE is Government’s Public Admin and Defense Expenditure 
PADEPC is Government’s Public Admin and Defense Expenditure per Capita 
GDPPC is GDP per Capita 
HHCONPC is Household Consumption Expenditure per Capita 
INFL is the Rate of inflation 
SB is the dummy variable for Structural Break11 taking a value 1 from 2006 to 2015 and a value of 0 
otherwise.  
µt-1 is lagged residual from the regression of same equation in levels 
 
Secondly we also employ Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model suggested by Pesaran and Shin 
(1999) and Pesaran et al (2001) which allows the use of both stationary and non-stationary variables in one 
model and can also produce long and short run relationships. Pesaran and Shin (1999) showed that ARDL-
based estimators are super-consistent, and valid inferences on the long-run parameters can be drawn using 
the standard normal asymptotic theory. Before estimating ARDL bounds test, stationarity of all the 
variables has been examined by applying Dickey and Fuller (1979) unit root test to determine the order of 
integration. Although ARDL bounds test approach does not require all the variables to be integrated of 
same order but I(2) variables cannot be included, since computed F-statistic under bounds testing approach 
are based on the assumption that variables are either integrated of order zero or one i.e., I(0) or I(1). While 
using ARDL for estimation in addition to our three previously used shadow economy indicator variables 
we also include an interaction term between the dummy variable dictator and currency demand as another 
proxy for intensity of control and regulation in the economy. The dictator variable has a value of “1” during 
period of dictatorships while is equal to “0” during democracies. Hence it will be an attempt to see if the 
currency demand increases during dictatorships which are generally assumed to be periods of extensive 
control over the economy relative to democratic periods. Rest we include usual control variable for explain 
the currency demand in an economy. We estimated the following model with ARDL: 
 
                                                          
11 As per BSD Circular No. 9 dated 18-7-2006, the amounts of Time Deposits with tenor of less than six months have been 
included to Demand Deposits from July 06. 
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where, 
C2DD is the Currency Deposit Ratio 
TAXGDP is the Direct Tax Revenue as percentage of GDP  
UNEMP is Rate of Unemployment 
PADE_per is Government’s Public Admin and Defense Expenditure per Capita 
GDPPC is GDP per Capita 
INFL is the Rate of inflation 
CD_DIC is the dummy interaction term between dictator and currency demand [Dictator = 1 during periods 
of dictatorship and 0 otherwise] 
HHCONPC is Household Consumption Expenditure per Capita 
SB is the dummy variable for Structural Break taking a value 1 from 2006 to 2015 and a value of 0 
otherwise.  
 
In all the three models our indicator variables (TAXGDP, UNEMP, PADE, PADEPC, PADE_per) 
represent additional demand for cash owing to shadow economic activities, therefore it is expected that they 
would appear with positive signs as already hypothesized. Additionally, we expect positive signs with all 
the independent variables to explain the official demand for cash except the structural break and error 
correction terms. Variable SB should be negative since currency deposit ratio would decrease after inclusion 
of time deposits in the total figure of demand deposits. We also expect negative signs with the lagged 
residual in the Engle Granger models (Models 1 & 2) and with Lagged Dependent Variable in ARDL 
(Model-3), since they represent error correction term and must have negative significant signs for the 
models to be meaningful.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Engle Granger Two Step Approach: 
All the variables were I(1) after being tested by Dicky Fuller Test suggested by Dickey and Fuller (1979) 
(Test results placed in Annex A table A.1). The results of Models 1 & 2 from second step after including 
lagged residual from the first step of EG approach are placed in Table 2.  
 
The difference between two models is basically the form in which “Public Admin and Defence 
Expenditure” appears in each equation. In Model-1 it is in the form of log of total expenditure while in 
Model-2 it is log of expenditure per capita. The small difference among the two coefficients despite 
difference in their composition clearly depicts that the variable actually captured what it is intended for i.e. 
proxy for government control and regulations in the economy. All the variables in Model 1 and 2 have 
expected signs except GDP per Capita, which is statistically insignificant.  
 
Most important for this study are the indicator variables for the shadow economic activity namely; tax to 
GDP ratio, unemployment rate, and public admin and defence expenditure. All these variables appear with 
the expected signs and confirm our hypotheses formulated earlier, showing that increased taxation, 
unemployment and intensity of control in the economy results into increased shadow economic activities. 
A one percent increase in TAXGDP ratio increases currency deposit ratio by 0.46 percent in Model-1 and 
0.44 percent in Model-2. Similarly, an increase in unemployment rate by 1 percent causes currency deposit 
13 
 
ratio to increase by 0.22 percent. The proxy for intensity of government regulation has almost similar 
magnitude as TAXGDP ratio.  
 
 
 
Table 2   Currency Demand Equation Using Engle Granger Two Step Procedure (Model 1 & 2) 
Dependent Variable : Currency to Deposit ratio (D1.lnc2dd)                    No. of Obs: 41 
Exogenous Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Description 
Variable 
Name 
Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t 
Lagged Currency to Deposit 
ratio 
L1.D1.lnc2dd 
0.078018 
(0.092324) 
0.405 
0.087632 
(0.091054) 
0.343 
Tax GDP Ratio D1.lntaxgdp  
0.464924* 
(0.247779) 
0.07 
0.439095* 
(0.240794) 
0.078 
Unemployment rate D1.lnunemp 
0.226589** 
(0.095879) 
0.025 
0.221129** 
(0.098406) 
0.032 
Public Admin & Defense 
Expenditure 
D1.lnpade 
0.465282** 
(0.214368) 
0.038 - - 
Public Admin & Defense 
Expenditure per Capita 
D1.lnpadepc - - 
0.449066** 
(0.194371) 
0.028 
GDP per Capita D1.lngdppc  
-1.75186 
(1.067717) 
0.111 
-1.73527 
(1.070033) 
0.115 
Household Consumption per 
Capita 
D1.lnhhconpc  
0.14885*** 
(0.044151) 
0.002 
0.149669*** 
(0.043881) 
0.002 
Rate of Inflation D1.infl_gdp  
0.001185 
(0.002403) 
0.625 
0.001165 
(0.002387) 
0.629 
Structural Break sb 
-0.47198*** 
(0.129632) 
0.001 
-0.47938*** 
(0.127861) 
0.001 
EC Term L1.resid  
-0.42896*** 
(0.128568) 
0.002 
-0.43696*** 
(0.126732) 
0.002 
Intercept _cons 
-0.06487 
(0.051018) 
0.213 
-0.05212 
(0.048506) 
0.291 
R Squared 0.5870 0.5876 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 (Robust Standard Error in Parentheses ) 
Dicky Fuller Test for Unit root in Residual 
Legend:  1%: -3.634    5%: -2.952    10%: -2.610 
-0.686 -0.689 
 
The table also contains unit root test for the residual of first step of Engle Granger Approach (estimation in 
levels) showing that residual is stationary, hence showing long run cointegration among the variables. When 
this residual is added as error correction term in these models it is negatively significant showing that the 
system reaches equilibrium. The disequilibrium is corrected by 42.8% annually in case of Model-1 while 
43.6% annually in case of Model-2. 
 
Table 3 below presents the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests for the regressions in Table 2. The 
null of “no serial correlation” from Breusch-Godfrey LM test and “constant variance” of Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg heteroskedasticity test cannot be rejected.  
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Table 3 Diagnostic Tests for Model 1 & 2 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
H0: no serial correlation 
chi2 = 0.134 
Prob > chi2 =  0.7147 
chi2 = 0.086 
Prob > chi2 =  0.7695 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity, Ho: Constant variance 
chi2 =  0.48 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4897 
chi2 =  0.54 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4644 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
Heteroskedasticity 
chi2 =41.00 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4265 
chi2 =41.00 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4265 
Skewness 
chi2 =11.17 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2642 
chi2 =11.00 
Prob > chi2 = 0.2760 
Kurtosis 
chi2 =0.22 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6406 
chi2 =0.37 
Prob > chi2 = 0.5418 
Total 
chi2 =49.42 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4965 
chi2 =52.37 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3822 
 
 
5.2 Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model 
Model-3 was estimated using ARDL bounds testing approach. Estimation results are placed at Table 4.  
All the variables were I(1) after being tested by Dicky Fuller Test suggested by Dickey and Fuller (1979) 
(Test results placed in Annex A table A.2). None of the variables is I(2) hence it was safe to run ARDL. 
One of the advantages of this technique is that we get long run as well as short run relationships among the 
variables. Results show that all the variables appear with expected signs except CD_DIC in short run, which 
is insignificant. Our indicator variables namely; TAX GDP, UNEMP and PADE_per also appear with 
expected signs showing that increased taxes, unemployment and increased intensity of government 
regulations and control in an economy leads to greater demand for cash and hence increased shadow 
economic activities, which again confirms our hypotheses. TAXGDP is significant at 1% while PADE_per 
and UNEMP are significant at 5% significant levels. The statistics for test of serial correlation by Breusch-
Godfrey LM test and heteroscedasticity by Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test are placed in Table 5 
showing that there is no problem of serial correlation or heteroscedasticity in the model. Further CUSUM 
and CUSUM Sq showing stability of the results are placed at Annexure. 
 
Table 4 Currency Demand Equation Using ARDL (Model 3) 
Dependent Variable : Currency to Deposit ratio (D1.lnc2dd)                              No. of Obs: 40 
Exogenous Variables Model 3 
 Description Variable Name Coefficient P>t 
ADJ           Lagged Currency to Deposit ratio L1.c2dd  
-0.7132889*** 
(0.1140522) 
0.000 
LR            
Tax GDP Ratio L1.taxgdp 
0.107691*** 
(0.0257733) 
0.000 
Unemployment Rate L1.unemp  
.0613354** 
(.0243673) 
0.018 
Public Admin & Defense 
Expenditure 
L1.lnpade_per  
.6007408** 
(.2305308) 
0.014 
GDP per Capita L1.lngdppc  
0.2126013 
(0.1524451) 
0.174 
Rate of Inflation L1.infl 
0.0160625*** 
(0.003971) 
0.000 
Household Consumption per Capita L1.lnhhconpc  0.0503329 0.281 
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(0.0458633) 
Currency Demand & Dictator 
(Dummy Interaction Var)  
L1.Cd_dic 
.0000142 
(.0000141) 
0.320 
Structural Break L1.sb  
-0.5402244*** 
(0.0797953) 
0.000 
SR            
Tax GDP Ratio D1.taxgdp 
0.0768148*** 
(0.0184372) 
0.000 
Unemployment Rate D1.unemp  
0.0437499**  
(0.0178016) 
0.020 
Public Admin & Defense 
Expenditure 
D1.lnpade_per  
0.4285018**  
(0.1679437) 
0.016 
GDP per Capita D1.lngdppc  
-1.778686** 
(0.7544943) 
0.025 
Rate of Inflation D1.infl 
0.0114572***  
(0.0028537) 
0.000 
Household Consumption D1.lnhhcons  
0.0359019 
(0.0315018) 
0.264 
Currency Demand & Dictator 
(Dummy Interaction Var)  
D1.Cd_dic 
-0.385336  
(0.0873575) 
0.340 
Structural Break D1.sb  
0.0000101***  
(0.0000104) 
0.000 
 Intercept _cons 
-3.231903*** 
(1.060926) 
0.005 
R-squared 0.66842976 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 (Standard Errors in Parentheses ) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5  Diagnostic Tests for Model 3 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
H0: no serial correlation 
chi2 = 0.135       Prob > chi2 =  0.7129 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity     
Ho: Constant variance 
chi2 =  2.16        Prob > chi2 = 0.1416 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
Heteroskedasticity chi2 =40.00        Prob > chi2 = 0.4256 
Skewness chi2 =7.13           Prob > chi2 = 0.7134 
Kurtosis chi2 =2.29           Prob > chi2 = 0.1299 
Total chi2 =49.42         Prob > chi2 = 0.4965 
 
The bounds test for long run cointegration is placed in Table 6. Since the calculated F statistic of 6.495 is 
above the upper bound, therefore, we can say that cointegration exists among the variables.  
 
Table 6  Bounds Test for Cointegration 
F-statistics calculated Lower Bound 
Critical Value at 
95% 
Upper Bound 
Critical Value at 
95% 
Decision 
6.495 2.22 3.39 Co-integration exists 
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The long run normalized equation from currency demand model above, which will be used for estimation 
of the shadow economy is as under: 
 
SBDICCDLnHHCONPCINFL
LnGDPPCperLnPADEUNEMPTAXGDPDDPC t
684.0_00003.0058.0032.0
318.0_014.1081.0127.0407.52
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6. Size of the Shadow Economy of Pakistan 
After the econometric estimations, simulations/calculations for the size of the shadow economy is carried 
out. The methodology adopted is such that the explanatory variables included to explain the extra demand 
for cash are to be held at their lowest level which provides the theoretical “official” demand for currency, 
which then are subtracted from the observed (total) demand for currency and finally provides the demand 
for currency generated due to shadow economic activities. These figures are multiplied by velocity of 
money in the official economy to get estimated size of the shadow economy. It needs to be highlighted that 
estimates of shadow economy from any technique, at best, give a trend in the shadow sector activities and 
in no case can be treated as exact, since estimates are subject to change with small changes in parameters. 
The main reason is hidden nature of agents in this sector and even direct estimates are as downward biased 
as the indirect estimates.   
 
Figure 3 is graphical representations of the estimated size and development of shadow economy in 
percentage of GDP from all the three models.  The table of results is placed in Annex A.2. Pakistan has had 
unstable political history which is evident from its periods of dictatorships and democracies spread across 
its existence. In order to elaborate on the yearly changes in estimates, each year in the figure has been 
coupled with the government regime of that year, where the head of state is mentioned if he/she was in 
power for six months or more in a given year. Interestingly the policies under two regimes might also differ 
specifically in terms of our new variable i.e. “intensity of regulations and control over the economy”. 
Displaying the estimates of shadow economy distributed across political regimes gives a meaningful 
understanding to our estimates.  
 
The shadow economy in Pakistan has been increasing overall since 1973, however, the increase has been 
more rapid during the periods 1975-1980 which can be seen in all the three models. East Pakistan declared 
independence in Year 1971 and became Bangladesh. A sharp increase in the period 1975-1980 might be 
due to the effects of losing a part of the economy. Moreover, the democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto was replaced by the Dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 which might be another reason for 
sharp increase in Shadow Economic activities. Model 1 & 2 show declining shadow economic activities in 
the latter periods of Zia’s regime which is not clear in Model 3. For rest of the years the three models follow 
a similar pattern. The reversal might be due to more liberal policies by Zia relative to Bhutto’s period which 
was covered in nationalization of many industries and strict control over the economy. From 1988-1990 
and 1993-1996 Ms. Benazir Bhutto was elected the Prime Minister of Pakistan and was removed from the 
government in 1990 by the  President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and in 1996 by President Farooq Ahmed Khan 
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Figure 3  Estimates of Shadow Economy as Percentage of GDP using Models 1, 2 and 3 
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Laghari on the charges of corruption. The sharp decline in shadow economy from 1999 onwards represents 
the period of coupe by General Pervaiz Musharaf, which was again a dictatorship. Immediately after his 
coupe some extreme measures were taken to control corruption in the Government and an independent 
organization, National Accountability Bureau, was established to handle corruption cases along with 
introduction of new Tax Reforms resulting in sharp decline in corruption in the establishment. However, 
after 2008-2015 there is again an increasing trend which might be owing to resignation of President 
Musharaf. 
 
7. Interaction between Official Sector and Shadow Economy 
One of the main questions about existence of shadow economy is how it effects the official sector? The 
literature may have mixed views in this regard but the effect might differ across various economies owing 
to the economic structure both in informal and formal sectors. For example Loayza (1996) in his growth 
model concluded that in economies where the statutory tax burden is larger than the optimal tax burden and 
the implementation of obedience is too weak, the increase of the relative size of informal economy generates 
a reduction of economic growth.  While on the other hand shadow economy stimulates the economic 
activity by giving jobs to the unemployed and providing services in the far-flung areas of an economy where 
the official sector has not yet reached. Schneider and Hametner (2007) for Columbia and Kemal (2007) for 
Pakistan and Dell’ Anno (2008) for Latin American Countries found a positive relation between the GDP 
growth and shadow economy. Therefore, we summarize our hypothesis: Increase in shadow economy may 
have a positive or negative effect on the growth of official economy.  
 
Although the informal sector may have a positive or negative impact, yet it would be interesting to 
differentiate between long and short run impact of informal sector on the official one. By using ARDL 
model we can have long and short run estimates of shadow economy on the economic growth. This is one 
of the novelties in our research paper for which the authors have found no evidence in past literature. The 
empirical analysis is carried out by using a log-log model with Log of GDP per capita as the dependent 
variable and log of shadow economy (as percentage of GDP) as exogenous variable along with other control 
variables for the yearly data from 1973-2015. All the variables have been tested for Unit roots by using 
Dicky Fuller tests to make sure that none of the variables are I(2), as already discussed; ARDL can only 
have I(0) and I(1) variables. The results are placed at Table A.3 in Annexure. Akaike Information Criteria 
has been used to check for the optimal number of lags to be employed in the model. The following model 
is estimated: 
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where 
 GDPPC is GDP per capita as the dependent variable 
 TINVPC is Total Investment per Capita 
 DEVHEXP is Development expenditure in health sector  
 TVIENROLL is enrollment in Technical and Vocational Institutes 
 UNIENROLL is enrollment in Universities 
 INFL is Rate of INflation 
 SE is the Shadow Economy as Percentage of GDP, own estimates. 
 
All the variables appear in log form. The variables TINVPC, DEVHEXP, TVIENROLL, and UNIENROLL 
are expected to have a positive sign while INFL is expected to have negative effect on economic growth. 
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The error correction term (Adjustment Term) is expected to have a negative significant sign. As already 
discussed, due to varying effects of shadow economy on the official sector, we might expect a positive or 
negative sign with the variable.  
 
The results are placed at Table 7. All the variables appear with expected signs in short and long run except 
UNIENROLL, which is not statistically significant. In long run Total Investment per capita, Technical & 
Vocational Institute Enrollment and Shadow economy as percentage of GDP have significant impacts. All 
these variables are significant at 1% level.  
 
Table 7        Interaction between Official and Unofficial Sectors 
 
The short run results are also as expected. The most interesting part is that shadow economy has significant 
negative impact in the short run, which is different from long run effect. The shadow sector is a burden to 
the economy owing to tax evasion. This results into greater tax burden in the official sector hence a negative 
impact. The positive impact of shadow economy on economic growth in long run depicts the situation that 
it is a safe haven for poor population, which is highly likely in a developing country like Pakistan with 
Dependent Variable: 1st Difference of GDP Per Capita ( D.lngdppc )            Number of Obs: 39 
 Variable Description Coefficient Std Error P>t 
ADJ L1.lngdppc GDP per Capita -.4119078*** 0.0665079 0.000 
LR 
L1.lntinvpc Total Inv per Capita .4342535*** 0.0695511 0.000 
L1.lndevhexp Development  Health Expenditure .0507818 .034773 0.160 
L1.lntvienroll Enrollment (TVI) .1626005*** 0.0450507 0.002 
L1.lnunienroll Enrollment (Uni) -.0098421 0.0314684 0.758 
L1.lninfl_gdp Rate of Inflation -.0196076 0.0117744 0.111 
L1.lnse SE as %age of GDP .235977*** 0.0418765 0.000 
SR 
L1D.lngdppc 
GDP per Capita 
-.5374779*** 0.1673397 0.004 
L2D. -.669267*** 0.1501029 0.000 
L3D -.236711* 0.134136 0.093 
D1.lntinvpc Total Inv per Capita .1788724*** 0.0366556 0.000 
D1.lndevhexp Development  Health Expenditure .0209174 0.0147898 0.173 
D1.lntvienroll Enrollment (TVI) .0669764*** 0.0224458 0.007 
D1.lnunienroll 
Enrollment (Uni) 
-.0221736 0.0179311 0.231 
L1D. -.0141002 0.0208296 0.506 
L2D. .0567216*** 0.01978 0.010 
L3D. .0622178*** 0.0192151 0.004 
D1.lninfl_gdp Rate of Inflation -.0080765 0.0046839 0.100 
D1.lnse 
SE as %age of GDP 
.0152208 0.0142467 0.298 
L1D. -.0502593*** 0.0168271 0.007 
L2D. -.0364915** 0.0174465 0.049 
L3D. -.0300869** 0.0135103 0.038 
_cons Constant Term 1.82392*** 0.3673542 0.000 
R-squared 0 .80589672 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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growing population. Many rural areas are deprived of basic facilities coupled with high unemployment rate, 
which as seen in the estimations section was causing an increased demand for currency. Hence it is evident 
that the officially unemployed have found means to earn income while staying hidden from the government 
documentation. Hence, tax evasion and sales tax skimming might be a major part of this positive impact. 
Additionally with excessive government control in the economy, the bureaucratic power itself might drive 
people towards alternate means to achieve a given legal right. The positive impact of shadow sector is 
further authenticated by the recent events in 2015-16, when owing to increase in Bank withholding tax rates 
on tax filers and non-filers12, many businessmen went on strikes against the Government13. This clearly 
shows that tax evasion is from the productive sector of the society as well. Further if we consider the factor 
of intensity of regulations and control that increases bureaucratic power, it is a possibility that absence of 
such formalities may bring efficiency in business processes in the unofficial sector. Still it cannot be ignored 
that the hidden sector might also consist of illegal activities, and hence an increase in shadow economy 
might also contain a part of increase in illegal activities.  
Table 8 gives the Bounds test statistic for Cointegration while Table 9 below presents diagnostic test 
statistics for the above results: 
 
Table 8  Bounds Test for Cointegration 
F-statistics calculated Lower Bound 
Critical Value at 
95% 
Upper Bound 
Critical Value at 
95% 
Decision 
7.584 2.45 3.61 Co-integration exists 
 
 
Table 9 Diagnostic Tests for Interaction Model 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
H0: no serial correlation 
chi2 = 0.121       Prob > chi2 =  0.7285 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
chi2 =  2.91        Prob > chi2 = 0.0879 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
Heteroskedasticity chi2 =40.00        Prob > chi2 = 0.4256 
Skewness chi2 =7.13           Prob > chi2 = 0.7134 
Kurtosis chi2 =2.29           Prob > chi2 = 0.1299 
Total chi2 =49.42         Prob > chi2 = 0.4965 
 
Since the F-statistic of 7.584 in Table 8 is above the upper bound critical vale, there is long run cointegration 
among the variables. The Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation and Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroskedasticity clearly show that there no is problem of heteroskedasticity or serial correlation 
in the model, since we cannot reject the null hypothesis in each case. The CUSUM and CUSUM squared 
graphs also confirm stability of the model and are placed at Annex A. Based on the above model Log run 
normalized equation is: 
 
                                                          
12 Withholding Tax on Non-filers is more than on filers, for every cash withdrawal 
13 Iqbal, S. (2015, July 5). Tax on cash withdrawals stokes dollar demand. Dawn. Retrieved from: 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1192489 
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The above equation shows that a 1 percentage increase in SE would lead to 0.573 percentage increase in 
GDP per Capita.  In order to empirically determine the relative and absolute influence of the shadow 
economy on official sector, for the study period, simulations are carried out. By using a dynamic simulation, 
the difference between official and theoretical real GDP per capita can be determined. Based on our 
estimates in table 7; shadow economy has positively and negatively contributed to GDP per capita in long 
and short runs respectively, hence by multiplying yearly variation in shadow economy with its estimated 
long run and short run coefficients and then subtracting long run result and adding short run result from the 
official recorded GDP per capita gives us the influence of Shadow Economy on the official economy of 
Pakistan, i.e. “What the official GDP per capita had been if the Shadow Economy had not been there?”. 
The simulation results are shown in Figure 4. The figure consists of three columns, the official GDP per 
capita, long run effect of Shadow Sector, and the last column is one where the short run effects are also 
accounted for by adding back the negative influence of shadow economy in the short run.  
 
Figure 4   Influence of Shadow Economy on Official Sector of Pakistan 
Figure above clearly shows that when the influence of Shadow Economy is removed using the estimated 
coefficient, the officially published figures are distorted, hence showing true picture of GDP per capita. 
Since the shadow economy has had positive effect on it in the Long run, therefore, if there had been no 
shadow economy the actual GDP per capita would have been lower. The same is presented in the table 
below for selected years, while the complete table is placed at Annex A.4.  
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year 
Official GDP per Capita 
(Pak Rupees) 
GDP per capita with no Shadow 
Economy (LR Effect Only) 
GDP per capita with no Shadow 
Economy (LR and SR Effect) 
1980 24917.80 21233.24 21540.01 
1985 29562.80 25759.60 26193.74 
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Table 10  Influence of Shadow Economy on Official Sector 
 
8. Summary and Conclusion 
One of the prime reasons for considering the shadow economy as a nuisance is that it distorts the national 
accounts statistics resulting undesired effects of economic policies. The type of activities in a shadow 
economy that take place might be different from one culture to another and from one development stage of 
an economy to another. The non-payment of taxes and license fees by entities in the informal sector results 
in a similar effect as cross-subsidization. The economic agents working in the official sector, by paying 
taxes and license fees, are also bearing the burden of those who choose to avoid such formalities.  
 
Pakistan’s public sector is dominated by bureaucratic dominance. Having a high share of population living 
below poverty line the local firms have to compete with the multinational firms from developed countries. 
Such firms have their basis in sound economic and political environment and are better able to compete 
with local firms who have to face political as well as economic turmoil on regular intervals. On one end it 
is necessary that education and research is promoted for the economic growth while on the other end 
providing people with a higher than minimum living standard is also of utmost importance. Like in many 
other developing parts of the world Pakistan also has the problem of corruption which when coupled with 
the shadow economy plays a role of catalyst as shown empirically by Schneider and Dreher (2006).  
 
 
 
Figure 5 5 Yearly Average Shadow Economy (%age of GDP) of Pakistan 
As already mentioned, being a developing country it needs to utilize its existing scarce resources up to its 
maximum potential, however due to such a large magnitude of unofficial sector it is losing a considerable 
amount of tax revenues. Moreover, the middle income class of population is bearing the huge burden of 
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5  Y E A R L Y  A V E R A G E  S H A D O W  E C O N O M Y  A S  P E R C E N T A G E  O F  G D P
EG Model 1 EG Model 2 ARDL Model 3
1990 33320.60 31748.93 32501.56 
1995 38512.40 29920.80 30414.39 
2000 41114.90 37271.55 37594.46 
2005 47803.90 45611.52 45961.90 
2010 51251.30 40917.82 41481.42 
2015 56061.20 48208.04 48879.25 
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those people who are mostly willingly avoiding the official sector. As the results show the increased 
taxation by the government is a major reason behind growth of shadow economy. The average Shadow 
Economy of Pakistan as percentage of GDP (26.41, 25.29, and 26.11 from Models 1, 2, and 3 respectively), 
and the plotted 5 yearly averages in Figure 5 above, clearly show that there is considerable leakage in 
revenue collection.  
 
The most important conclusions that can be derived from this study are; 
 
(1) The shadow economy is comprised of complex activities, therefore, the governments must consider the 
actual situation while making policies to curtail these activities since increased laws and regulations can 
either have a reducing effect or might play the role of a catalyst in further expanding such activities. New 
laws and regulations often feed the bureaucracy’s hunger for power rather than making the system 
beneficial for its users. Therefore, governments must consider the cost of their own policies, before making 
a choice of a certain policy action. 
 
(2) It is very important to consider that quite an extensive amount of revenue is being lost due to tax evasion, 
moreover increasing taxes further cause an increase in the shadow economic activities hence it is not a 
solution. Therefore, they should consider increasing the collection of existing tax revenues rather than 
increasing existing tax rates or implementing new taxes.  
 
(3) The governments should consider such policies which attract people towards the official sector by 
providing incentives, like high quality public sector services may be ensured rather than pure bureaucratic 
formalities which hamper economic activities. A recent step14 (year 2014-15) in this direction has been 
linking tax filing with reduced cost of other documented facilities like reduced vehicle registration fee, 
reduced withholding tax at cash withdrawal from banks etc. However, the outcomes of these incentives will 
be visible in near future.  
                                                          
14 Income Tax Ordinance 2001 through Finance Bill (2014-15) 
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Annexure 
Table A.1 Unit Root Test for Variables in Model 1 & 2 
Variable At Level Result At 1st Difference Result 
lnc2dd -0.232 I(1) -5.568 I(0) 
lntaxgdp  -1.691 I(1) -8.907 I(0) 
lnunemp -1.617 I(1) -6.260 I(0) 
lnpade -1.270 I(1) -4.935 I(0) 
lnpadepc -0.889 I(1) -5.000 I(0) 
lngdppc  -1.321 I(1) -4.789 I(0) 
lnhhconpc  -1.894 I(1) -6.448 I(0) 
infl -2.917 I(1) -4.146 I(0) 
Critical Value Legend:    1%: -3.634         5%: -2.952           10%: -2.610 
 
Table A.2 Unit Root Test for Variables in Model 3 
Variable At Level Result At 1st Difference Result 
C2dd  -0.680 I(1) -6.493 I(0) 
Taxgdp -1.704 I(1) -8.508 I(0) 
Unemp  -1.515 I(1) -6.005 I(0) 
Lnpade_per  -1.260 I(1) -5.393 I(0) 
Lngdppc  -1.321 I(1) -4.789 I(0) 
Infl -2.917 I(1) -4.146 I(0) 
Lnhhconpc  -1.047 I(1) -8.977 I(0) 
Cd_dic -2.057 I(1) -6.447 I(0) 
Critical Value Legend:    1%: -3.634         5%: -2.952           10%: -2.610 
 
Table A.3 Unit Root Test for Variables in Interaction Model 
Variable At Level Result At 1st Difference Result 
L1.lngdppc -1.135 I(1) -4.693 I(0) 
L1.lntinvpc -2.921 I(1) -4.662 I(0) 
L1.lndevhexp -1..045 I(1) -5.864 I(0) 
L1.lntvienroll 0.115 I(1) -5.911 I(0) 
L1.lnunienroll 1.084 I(1) -5.545 I(0) 
L1.lninfl -2.772 I(1) -3.394 I(0) 
L1.lnse -2.969 I(1) -7.095 I(0) 
Critical Value Legend:    1%: -3.634         5%: -2.952           10%: -2.610 
 
 
 
 
 
A.1 Stability of Model 3 Currency Demand Equation Results: 
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A.2 Estimates of Shadow Economy as Percentage of GDP 
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A.3 Stability of Interaction Results 
Regime/Year EG Model 1 EG Model 2 ARDL Model 1 
1973 16.04 15.30 19.82 
1974 23.43 22.22 26.13 
1975 18.54 17.65 25.53 
1976 19.09 18.17 25.77 
1977 19.97 19.01 24.62 
1978 22.55 21.42 29.52 
1979 25.33 24.04 30.14 
1980 31.87 30.19 34.46 
1981 30.20 28.57 33.90 
1982 27.07 25.65 29.45 
1983 31.38 29.77 34.75 
1984 27.78 26.40 34.67 
1985 21.54 20.51 29.64 
1986 23.66 22.49 33.21 
1987 19.05 18.04 34.40 
1988 14.27 13.45 30.61 
1989 16.42 15.45 32.89 
1990 17.77 16.70 32.66 
1991 35.04 33.58 34.14 
1992 35.50 33.89 33.35 
1993 30.52 29.07 31.46 
1994 26.08 24.91 25.95 
1995 36.24 34.54 34.17 
1996 41.37 39.40 39.87 
1997 38.10 36.42 34.35 
1998 33.83 32.42 30.32 
1999 34.77 33.41 31.24 
2000 29.10 28.20 20.10 
2001 31.91 30.87 20.93 
2002 31.51 30.53 22.29 
2003 33.12 32.03 23.32 
2004 29.77 28.86 19.14 
2005 27.39 26.54 15.89 
2006 21.24 20.68 11.17 
2007 19.61 19.00 10.12 
2008 21.50 20.75 10.76 
2009 19.27 18.69 8.81 
2010 26.05 25.08 15.47 
2011 21.74 21.09 13.96 
2012 27.31 26.34 21.75 
2013 24.44 23.67 22.09 
2014 24.23 23.41 22.12 
2015 30.16 29.00 27.70 
Average 26.41 25.29 26.11 
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A.4 Interaction between Official and Unofficial Sectors 
C
U
S
U
M
Year
 CUSUM  lower
 upper
1981 2015
0 0
C
U
S
U
M
 s
q
u
a
re
d
Year
 CUSUM squared
1981 2015
0
1
31 
 
year Official GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita with no Shadow 
Economy (LR Effect Only) 
GDP per capita with no Shadow 
Economy (LR and SR Effect) 
1974 22183.50 16325.90 - 
1975 22359.00 19685.46 - 
1976 22401.40 22019.95 - 
1977 22353.20 21761.26 22274.79 
1978 23367.70 21640.42 21866.75 
1979 23928.40 22233.46 22450.35 
1980 24917.80 21233.24 21540.01 
1981 25728.70 24955.37 25504.99 
1982 26841.80 25245.95 25669.32 
1983 27802.00 25266.62 25680.68 
1984 28038.20 26198.32 26573.00 
1985 29562.80 25759.60 26193.74 
1986 30497.40 28777.51 29395.13 
1987 31301.70 27803.85 28322.99 
1988 32311.90 27666.72 28317.74 
1989 32846.80 30014.05 30759.25 
1990 33320.60 31748.93 32501.56 
1991 34118.30 15114.97 15701.06 
1992 35644.60 35380.10 37389.99 
1993 35392.20 32551.94 33918.05 
1994 35923.10 32926.70 34247.15 
1995 38512.40 29920.80 30414.39 
1996 40062.90 36809.46 37975.02 
1997 39772.10 37969.11 38991.65 
1998 40189.50 37612.53 38450.95 
1999 40913.90 40265.57 40788.25 
2000 41114.90 37271.55 37594.46 
2001 41078.50 38806.49 39323.06 
2002 41525.40 41228.37 41711.58 
2003 42427.00 41180.93 41565.24 
2004 44717.90 42126.28 42391.72 
2005 47803.90 45611.52 45961.90 
2006 49660.70 43271.09 43730.74 
2007 51482.40 49225.21 50113.25 
2008 51920.00 49067.64 49817.77 
2009 51016.70 47994.62 48727.56 
2010 51251.30 40917.82 41481.42 
2011 52024.10 47089.40 48355.77 
2012 52933.10 45162.97 46447.70 
2013 53778.60 50539.75 52126.38 
2014 54844.30 54575.57 55651.15 
2015 56061.20 48208.04 48879.25 
 
